

# Freedom in the dissociative process

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The authors put forward the thesis that freedom in psychoanalysis concerns method and process primarily, even before the content. Also, following Freud, there must be support in the analytic process for the patient and analyst's ability to allow themselves a free play of free associations (what Bollas considers the goal of the analytic process). Freedom is especially achieved by sustaining the fluid dynamic between Multiple Dissociated Self-States. The authors emphasise the distinction between *repression* and *dissociation*, where the former, as avoidance of conflict, blocks the fluid dynamic between Self-States, whereas dissociation, in line with early Freud (1894), Breuer (1899) and Janet (1889), may be considered as a suspension of the synthesis or associative capacities. In this blockage or suspension of the associative capacities, the analytic process tries to foster greater levels of freedom also by using the originality of the associative sequences. Two brief clinical examples highlight how the blockage of the capacities for free association is especially evident in obsessional organisations and above all when dynamics of repression predominate. The creative interpretations of dreams and of the analyst's enactments can facilitate greater levels of freedom in the associations and in the exchanges between the analyst and the patient.